Why did Germany lose on the Eastern Front

[irik]

I know yes, it would snow, the Red Army had T34s and Kv tanks when the germans had worse tanks.

[GamblerSK]

imho fact that germans fought on two fronts was very bad idea also Hitler become more paranoic and gives strange comands and other things such as that snow, enemy equipment, strategy...

[redguardsoldier]

Hitler participated a large part in German defeat in WW2. Many stupid orders were made. Like the order not to give the Panzer VI Tiger the sloped armor because it's originated by Soviets, that result in a heavier Tiger (sloped armor mean more protection with less steel). Hitler was not trained to be commander but he like to be, so his commanders cannot do their best. And the order not to withdraw the 6th Army in Stalingrad, that city was already a mess of ruin, with nothing valuable except the word "Stalin" in its name.

The russian winter is also a damn thing. Napoleon lost to it. And imagine you with some 9 kamerad holding waves after waves of Soviet infantry. Soviet outnumbered German in a ridiculous way, their casualties also outnumbered German's but the population even do that in a greater ratio. German stuffs are always good. But a bit like masterpiece, very hard to make, too complicated for mass production. I heard that German tanks give their crews a lot of comfort, since Soviet tanks are narrow, too hot for their crews, not much chance to survive (Soviets designers don't care much about emergency doors), but are ways cheaper, simpler to produce.

[Tiger 131]

I thought the tiger was already designed by Henschel before the T-34 was encountered, hence the inspiration for sloping armour in later German tanks (Panther, Tiger II) and there was not time for a new design.

I had never heard Hitler had much to do with its design, he merely chose it over the Porshe model.

[Ost_Front_Soldat]

Way more reasons that I can count. But the most dire mistakes imo;

1. Having a brilliant politician, who, since he was a corporal at one time was fit to be the "Grand Field Marshal"
2. Underestimating the Red Army in combination with overestimating what the German military could do.
3.Hitler's inability to understand logistics and that armies don't just arm, fuel, and feed themselves out of thin air.
4. Hitler's childish ego, in that he did not accept his High Staff's ideas...because they were not his own.
5. Trying to occupy a nation of 170 million people with a  3 million man army.
6. Expecting the war to be over in a matter of weeks....even if Germany was a true superpower and the USSR had no economy, the size of the country alone is a huge obstacle. No winter equipment? Wtf? Hitler read about Napoleon's conquests, admired them, but learned nothing from them.

[Paciat]

Why did Soviets allmost lose on the Eastern Front? is a better question.

They had more and better tanks than the whole world combined. Guns like ZiS-2, ZiS-3 (germany copied it to make their Pak 7,5cm) 152mm 1937 howitzer were the best in the whole world at that time (1941).
The russian deep battle concept(russian blitzkrieg) was created in early-mid 30s. Russians had strong and mobile mechanized corps, unlike the French.
The MiG-3, Jak-1, Pe-2 and Il2 planes were as good as Me-109, Ju-88 and Ju-87. Il2 was so well armored that even 20mm shells sometimes bounced of it.

The answer is:
1. Winter.
2. In russia oficers were allways shi@#.
3. In the mid 30s when Stalin came to power he send to siberia(if not killed them and send their families) anyone who didnt want to be communist. People didnt want to fight for such a tiran as Stalin.
4. In the mid 30s when hitler was saving economy in his country Stalin started building up his army and military industry. He was selling food for technology (also british tanks - T-26, T-28, T-35, US cristie suspention and many more) while some Soviets died in hunger. Again people didnt want to fight for such a tiran.

In first monts of the war soviets mass deserted from the army becouse they hoped for a better life after Stalin looses the war. There were high hopes for independent Ukraine and baltic states. Some people belived that german tanks have crosses on them becouse their leading a crusade to defeat antichrist Stalin. Some soviets even started to fight their own army.
Monts past and people found out that Hitler and Stalin are the same. Still there were some units (like Ukrainian cossacks) that fought till 1945 alongside germany.

[Shadowmetroid]

Basically, Germany got cocky.
Tried to fight too many countries on multiple fronts, no less.
Couldn't keep up with their industrial strength.
Stretched their army to thin...
Underestimated the enemy.
Overestimated their military might.
etc, etc.
In short, they screwed up.

[comrade_daelin]

Quite frankly, Hitler did not get the Eastern Front he was hoping for.

Barbarossa's objective was a quick victory over Russia; this was done via the classical Blitzkrieg tactic that worked in France and the Low Countries. The idea was to rapidly blast through into Russia, sieze resources wherever and encircle whole portions of the Soviet army. Whatever stood in their path was blasted, but the main goal was a "bloodless kill"- lopping off the head of the enemy quickly than wearing him down. After such shock and awe, it was hoped that the German forces would sieze Moscow and Russia would capitulate.

The Germans did indeed manage to rapidly smash through Soviet resistance, wipe out whole armies (technically Corps-size formations IIRC). The satellite states like Ukraine and Poland initially welcomed the Germans as liberators from Communist totalitarianism. The purged and antiquidated Red Army crumbled whenever it chose to stand ground, and the average soldier faced death from the advancing enemy or execution for cowardice. If not for a number of seemingly significant but critical factors there was indeed a real chance Barbarossa was successful.

First off, the blitzkrieg was both a success and failure; the army moved so fast that some encircled Soviet formations continued as partisans, disrupting the supply chain and hindering German efforts in securing the vast territory they held. Second, the Germans moved so fast that supply lines were extended making partisan activity far more dangerous than it would be. The Germans may advance far, but once they reach their limit the Blitzkrieg tactic is largely nullified of its important elements- speed shock and mobility. The Germans reached barely reached Moscow but failed to take it, allowing the Soviet leadership to relocate and continue safely. Soviet industry was also packed up and merely moved eastward, far from German bombers. Third, the Germans relied on Blitzkrieg to achieve a quick victory that made anything less a garunteed failure.

Because of the factors of overextended logistics, harassing partisans and the aparent lack of a Soviet collapse, the Germans then had to adjust to these new problems. The SS deployed Einsatzgruppen forces to enforce Nazi ideology, that is, killing Jews, enslaving Slavs for work and general brutality, losing local support and consequently feeding partisan activity. The Russians burned much of what they can't salvage as they retreated, forcing the Germans to rely entirely on supply lines rather than local sources of food and fuel to bolster their ability to continue fighting.

Fourth, since Germany had not anticipated a prolonged Soviet resistance, development of long-range bombers to inflict damage on the war industry was not prioritized. Here we see the same mistake Hitler made in the Battle of Britain: the decision to target cities instead of finishing off the RAF (which ironically was nearly battered and defeated utterly without the Germans realizing it). So when factories packed up and moved out of bomber range, the Soviets were able to continue manufacturing the means to fight the Germans. No matter how many Russian troops and vehicles they killed, more of them came, while the Germans were running themselves into the ground.

So a short summary would be:
-lack of further planning into the posible scenarios of Barbarossa (namely, the chance that campaign goals were not achievable in time such as winning before the onset of winter)
-inabiltiy to maintain logistics
-unwillingness to favourably treat occupied areas thus allowing the enemy to operate behind the lines
-inability to strike the heart Russia that is the war industry- Russian lives and materiel were the blood, but so long as the heart kept beating, Russia wouldn't flounder
-Hitler's unrealistic expectations and demands on the German army to achieve objectives without addressing these issues

In analogy, Germany was continuously punching the air out of Russia, but never stopped it from breathing. Everytime the Germans ran out of steam, the Russians struck back. However valiantly the Germans withstood Russian offensives, every German loss was far more fatal than a Russian one. Russia can afford to be sloppy, while Germany could not.

[loatty]

i just wanted to say: WOW!
as far as my knowledge about the Eastern Front goes, you're completely right!

and indeed, the Blitzkrieg depended on speed, denying the opponent's overall capability to fight.

[Jagged]

Nazi Germany never suffered a defeat until Stalingrad. The rolled over countries in weeks previous to Barbarossa. "Mission Accomplished" was supposedly just in sights.

[Akalonor]

I agree with most others here sayin that Hitler tried to do everything, and He was a good politician just not a good Military leader and many other things at the same time.
And to be honest how many Americans want George W Bush leading the Military & it's operations?

[StormsDivision]

I will submit my thoughts.

The german army was not prepared for large scale war, Operation Barbarossa was meant to defeat the soviet union in a short blitzkrieg campaign lasting no longer than a year or two.

By 1943 After the defeat at Stalingrad and Kursk, the manpower of the German military was greatly depleted of it's offensive capabilities, a strong force still but could not match to the millions of Russian troops, and could not replace the colossal losses as Stalingrad and Kursk.

--

What I think Hitler should have done? Deal with Britain first.

When you think about it, Germany had at least an extra million or so troops in the west. If he had dealt with Britain first he could have withdrew up to half of that (around enough to create an entire new army) and sent it to the east. Furthermore, there would not have been much threat from the western countries. By the time Germany had taken Russia, they would have had access to the Nuke. Once they had the Nuke then no country was really in a position to stop them, they would have wiped America out. Not to mention the huge resource bonus Germany could have got from taking Russia, by far enough to create an entire armada of ships, planes and well trained troops in a few years. By far enough to take America.

[cephalos]

I think that Germany somehow won the war. I don't mean full victory, but... Stalin's army had 20.000 tanks in 1941, and in 1942 he would be ready to attack. Then Germany would be screwed, and in few months time we would have French Soviet Republic, alongside with German, Polish and many others...
German Army was trained, equipped and they surprised Soviets. However they didn't have any intelligence in Soviet Union. They didn't expect that in russia there were so bad roads ( and asphalt one were very rare). Also they lost one month while conquering Jugoslavia and Greece.

[Sovereign]

Quite frankly, Hitler did not get the Eastern Front he was hoping for.
Well tbh Hitler didn't want to fully understand the gravity of the situation of staging the largest offensive ever.. This is made evident by this statement of his "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down"

Barbarossa's objective was a quick victory over Russia; this was done via the classical Blitzkrieg tactic that worked in France and the Low Countries. The idea was to rapidly blast through into Russia, sieze resources wherever and encircle whole portions of the Soviet army. Whatever stood in their path was blasted, but the main goal was a "bloodless kill"- lopping off the head of the enemy quickly than wearing him down. After such shock and awe, it was hoped that the German forces would sieze Moscow and Russia would capitulate.
True but as any military theorist would tell you, all the other lucrative objectives given in precedence of this made it very difficult to achieve this, hell most modern armies would have difficult with the strain and frictions of war that would come from this. Barbarossa treated Russia as another France and didn't take proper measures to all the "what if" scenarios, flexibility over temporary supremacy a lesson often taught by Clausewitz and others which had been greatly ignored in both WWs, they approached Russia with the same mind set as France imagining a great double envelopment of Moscow after all the side objectives were presumably handled and completed.

The Germans did indeed manage to rapidly smash through Soviet resistance, wipe out whole armies (technically Corps-size formations IIRC). The satellite states like Ukraine and Poland initially welcomed the Germans as liberators from Communist totalitarianism. The purged and antiquidated Red Army crumbled whenever it chose to stand ground, and the average soldier faced death from the advancing enemy or execution for cowardice. If not for a number of seemingly significant but critical factors there was indeed a real chance Barbarossa was successful.

First off, the blitzkrieg was both a success and failure; the army moved so fast that some encircled Soviet formations continued as partisans, disrupting the supply chain and hindering German efforts in securing the vast territory they held. Second, the Germans moved so fast that supply lines were extended making partisan activity far more dangerous than it would be. The Germans may advance far, but once they reach their limit the Blitzkrieg tactic is largely nullified of its important elements- speed shock and mobility. The Germans reached barely reached Moscow but failed to take it, allowing the Soviet leadership to relocate and continue safely. Soviet industry was also packed up and merely moved eastward, far from German bombers. Third, the Germans relied on Blitzkrieg to achieve a quick victory that made anything less a guaranteed failure.
Yes but the main failures of the campaign was ensuring flexibility and speed and priority, without all the other  lucrative objectives that were deemed vital, the germans could have just seized the Caucus oil fields and main infrastructure which would then cripple the Russians war machine and efforts, then they could force them into their own terms and not vice versa.
 
Because of the factors of overextended logistics, harassing partisans and the aparent lack of a Soviet collapse, the Germans then had to adjust to these new problems. The SS deployed Einsatzgruppen forces to enforce Nazi ideology, that is, killing Jews, enslaving Slavs for work and general brutality, losing local support and consequently feeding partisan activity. The Russians burned much of what they can't salvage as they retreated, forcing the Germans to rely entirely on supply lines rather than local sources of food and fuel to bolster their ability to continue fighting.
Logistic failings happened even before the campaign began with the conception of Barbarossa. Like I stated even modern armies today would have difficulty with such scale of partisan activity and such scale especially consider the fact that at the time allot of their aid from the Luftwaffe were stretched from the very west of France and to Africa.
Fourth, since Germany had not anticipated a prolonged Soviet resistance, development of long-range bombers to inflict damage on the war industry was not prioritized. Here we see the same mistake Hitler made in the Battle of Britain: the decision to target cities instead of finishing off the RAF (which ironically was nearly battered and defeated utterly without the Germans realizing it). So when factories packed up and moved out of bomber range, the Soviets were able to continue manufacturing the means to fight the Germans. No matter how many Russian troops and vehicles they killed, more of them came, while the Germans were running themselves into the ground.
Which could have all been avoided had they had clearly defined the objectives and focused on the infrastructure.

So a short summary would be:
-lack of further planning into the posible scenarios of Barbarossa (namely, the chance that campaign goals were not achievable in time such as winning before the onset of winter) Well winter did play a factor but is often time over emphasized as the Russians could also feel its affects and get frostbite no?
-inabiltiy to maintain logistics
Yes and the failure to consolidate forces and manage supply lines.
-unwillingness to favourably treat occupied areas thus allowing the enemy to operate behind the lines
Yes and no certain areas such as the Ukraine meet the new occupation with relief of being freed from Stalins regime..
-inability to strike the heart Russia that is the war industry- Russian lives and materiel were the blood, but so long as the heart kept beating, Russia wouldn't flounder
Well they had planned on doing so but like I have stated because of the way the operation and levied objectives it was not possible to achieve this in the quick and decisive way which Blitzkrieg called for. 
-Hitler's unrealistic expectations and demands on the German army to achieve objectives without addressing these issues
Common knowledge, the main reasoning for the operation and all its elaboration was in fact Hitlers strong desire for a shock and awe effect that he determined would crush the allies morale. "When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment."
In analogy, Germany was continuously punching the air out of Russia, but never stopped it from breathing. Everytime the Germans ran out of steam, the Russians struck back. However valiantly the Germans withstood Russian offensives, every German loss was far more fatal than a Russian one. Russia can afford to be sloppy, while Germany could not.
Another main reason left out was due to the indecisiveness promoted by Barbarossa it gave the Stalin plenty of time to reorganize and mobilize armies from the far east who should had still been occupied by the Japaneses

[UeArtemis]

I'm tired of reading about Ukraine, which is "joyfully greeted the Germans." It was rare and it is only in the west. A small number of traitors does not give the right to say so about the whole Ukraine.
Millions fought for the Soviets, hundreds/thousands of happily greeted the Germans.