I do think though that there are two events which could've given Germany victory. People have always criticized Hitler’s move to split the panzer armies from army group centre. By sending Guderian south to Kiev and bagging 660,000 prisoners before Moscow had been taken. This had its obvious advantages, but one thing that I have never seen discussed is what instead of instead of sending those panzers and panzer grenadier division north to Leningrad, if they had of used them to continue the advance on Moscow from the northern flank? To me, in sending them to Leningrad they could have been a use to help any assault, though he didn’t opt for this and instead sieged it so that the Russians would be burdened rather than them, by the need to feed the massive civilian population over winter. To me if he had of ordered the assault and the city fell, it would of freed up an enormous amount of troops necessary to go on to Moscow the following spring, whilst bagging over 500,000+ prisoners, I know about then having to feed the civilians but to me this would of been worth the effort. So to me he should have either let them continue to Moscow while it was largely undefended, or take the casualties losses in an assault on Leningrad.
The 2nd grand mistake was in operation blue (the 1942 offensive into the causacus). When the Germans were advancing towards Stalingrad they encountered virtually no resistance, so Hitler ordered the 4th Panzer army to crossover the path of Paulus's 6th Army group and head towards the Baku oilfields. What resulted was vehicles being congested, breaking down, units taking the wrong roads etc, and as a result Paulus's advance was virtually brought to a standstill for 3 weeks. And it was only in these last 3 weeks that the Russians built their defences and were reinforced around Stalingrad, hence had they not been delayed, they would of easily defeated the Russians there just like they did for every other major city. The reason why this is so important is not because of the reduced German casualties in men and tanks (who would also now be freed to counter any Russian historical envelopment attacks). But because the Volga was the only way left for the Russians to ferry all of their fuel being produced from the Baku oil fields into Russia. And with the Germans now easily able to prevent any ferries going up the river, Russia's economy/armies would of been brought to a standstill, and Stalin would have been forced to surrender.
Other contributing but not sole factors I think were Hitler’s decision not to put the economy onto a full time war production until after Feb 1943 was pretty dumb.The Germans had the necessary winter clothing for the men, at the rail yards, but due to the extremely limited amount of trains that they were able to operate, it was a decision of "do we send them ammunition/fuel or clothes?". So it may very well of been Russia's use of different size gauge rail tracks that won them the war.
Though I wouldn’t entirely blame Hitler for their defeat either. Up until October 1942 he had achieved outstanding success in Europe, that is highly unlikely to of been unmatched by any other individual. He was able to lift Germany’s economy from the great depression and huge debt owed to the Allies for WW1, and it was he who encouraged and approved the blitzkrieg doctrine, against the advice of nearly all his senior army staff. He was responsible for the promotion and greater responsibilities given to relatively unknown generals in Von Manstein, Guderian, Rommel etc, and did away with the trench warfare loving old guard generals. He went for the close bomber support over the favoured strategic bombing (which was post-war realised to have been grossly over exaggerated). He favoured submarines over a surface fleet wanted by the admirals. He annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia without a shot fired, an amazing political manoeuvre.Many thought Poland would withstand the German attack for 6 months (is why the French did not react initially), yet Hitler chose the plan responsible for Poland’s surrender in a matter of 5 weeks. The senior German staff wanted to re-use the schliffein plan to invade France, though Hitler overrode them and went with the unknown commander Erich Von Mansteins plan with a few adjustments. A stroke of genius. Also at the time very few could criticize him for the halt order at Dunkirk. The German high command had wanted to halt Guderian’s advance for a number of days preceding it, however Hitler overrode them and let Guderian continue to make the Dunkirk encirclement even possible. In addition, the terrain was notoriously bad for tank warfare/movement, and France was still far from beaten, so he still needed all of his tanks to ensure victory against the French who were easily considered to have the greatest army in the world at the time.What’s more is that he was right to consider Africa a complete sideshow, and the men and supplies were of much greater importance on the Russian front. As even if Germany did capture the middle east, they and the Italians combined didn’t have enough of a merchant fleet to ship any of the oil back to Europe for refinement and actual use.
In the face of the soviets 1941 winter counter offensives, every German general wanted abandon all their vehicles and equipment to withdraw hundreds of miles, however Hitler ordered them to adopt a hedgehog style of defence which amazingly held the line, with few combat casualties. And Historians have since believed that if the generals had of got their way, that not only would they have lost vast amounts of vital equipment but also that their troops would have been cut down and suffered numerously more thousands of casualties to frostbite. Then the decision to not allow the Stalingrad pocket to escape, whilst costly, was believed to have saved the entire Southern Group A (2-3 times larger than Army group 6) As it forced 7 Russian army groups to dig in around and tie down the German 6th army at Stalingrad, preventing the Russians from marching on to the undefended city of Rostov and cutting off and annihilating all of Army Group A, which was still trying to retreat as quickly from deep within the Caucasus. Coupled with the previous winters successful supply of the Demansyk pocket with 100,000+ German troops for several months, he actually made the correct decision. Though in a way I would put part of the blame back on him for not providing more resources that could have been made available to the front.
As for declaring war with the US, this had no meaningful influence whatsoever until 1943, by which time the Germans chances of success on the Eastern front were already gone. So whilst not smart, it only hastened the end of the war, which was always going to be decided by the results of the Eastern Front in 1941-42.After the Germans unsuccessful attempt to rescue the Stalingrad pocket however, all hope of victory was lost, and no decision however crazy was going to stop the Russians.I had previously thought that the best year to attack Russia would have been in 1942, though experts have since sighted that after the great Russian officer purges and their dismal performance of the Russians-Finnish war (1940), that their officers/doctrines and recruit training, was going through a complete overhaul, and would have been able to defend against the Germans in stages with much greater efficiency, had they had the time to carry it out. In addition the Russians would have finished relocating all of their factories into the Urals. Also by 1942, the Russians would have learned through their famous spy (Richard Sorge) that the Japanese did not plan to attack into Siberia, and hence the Russians could have moved most of their Siberian divisions into Eastern Europe to further bolster the defences.
The krauts lost the war because they were bastards and no Ruski, Tommy or Yankee would allow such evil to exist in their world.Millions died to stop them
Alot of people seem to say that the war was won in the East but really without the US I doubt that the Soviets could have beat the Germans back with the entire Wehrmacht thrown at them. The US was the hammer and the Soviets the anvil.